How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Respect Post-Persons

Authors

  • Ethan Terrill Northern Virginia Community College

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.55613/jeet.v31i1.84

Abstract

Advocates of the Respect Model of moral status have expressed skepticism about the possibility that radically enhanced persons will have a higher threshold of moral status over non-radically enhanced persons. While several philosophers have already argued that advocates of the Respect Model of moral status should recognize such a possibility in a world with radically enhanced persons, I make room for a stronger claim: advocates of the Respect Model of moral status should not only recognize the possibility of higher thresholds of moral status, but in fact are committed to the normative view that radically enhanced persons should have a higher threshold of moral status over non-radically enhanced persons. This stronger claim induces both rational and self-interested worries about the sacrificeability of non-radically enhanced persons, which takes the form of the inequality of immunity problem. While this problem need not rationally worry the advocate of the Respect Model of moral status, I provide some exploratory solutions that can be implemented now to assuage future self-interested fears so that advocates of the Respect Model may learn to respect the dignity of radically enhanced persons.

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Published

2022-02-11

How to Cite

How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Respect Post-Persons. (2022). Journal of Ethics and Emerging Technologies, 31(1), 1-14. https://doi.org/10.55613/jeet.v31i1.84