Are Children The Future?

Longtermism, Epistemic Discounting, and Pronatalism

Authors

  • James Hughes University of Massachusetts Boston

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.55613/jeet.v35i2.173

Keywords:

Longtermism, Epistemic Discounting, Pronatalism, Existential Risk, Person-Affecting View, Reproductive Freedom, Effective Altruism

Abstract

Longtermists stress the moral importance of future generations, debating how to ethically discount their interests amid uncertainty, particularly regarding pronatalism. Some effective altruists and tech elites support pronatalism, sparking controversy. This article argues for significantly discounting the value of future lives due to radical epistemic uncertainty, rendering projections beyond 2100 highly speculative. It advocates a person-affecting view as a starting point, which prioritizes the well-being of living individuals and their near-term future selves. Within this framework, progressive pronatalism—supporting childbearing through subsidies while preserving reproductive freedom—is justified for its immediate societal benefits. However, uncertainties about longevity and automation challenge large-scale pronatalist efforts. Instead of speculative, long-term strategies, and an overwhelming focus on existential risk mitigation, this article calls for pragmatic policies with more proximate goals.

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Published

2025-03-10

Issue

Section

Special Issue: Existential Threats and Other Disasters

How to Cite

Are Children The Future? Longtermism, Epistemic Discounting, and Pronatalism. (2025). Journal of Ethics and Emerging Technologies, 35(2), 1-10. https://doi.org/10.55613/jeet.v35i2.173

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